A once-popular Jordanian anecdote about King Hussein shows how the country will behave after his demise.
According to legend, Hussein disguised himself to see what his people really thought. Of course, everyone said he loved his monarch. To discover what they really thought, Hussein began criticizing the king. Each time he did so, though, angry citizens assaulted him.
The point, he discovered in the story, was that Jordanians did not fear repression as much as turmoil. Hussein and his regime were their protection from chaos.
Today, Jordanian worries about insecurity and instability in the post-Hussein era are one of the best guarantees for the country’s stability. These worries ensure that the ruling elite will remain united and on alert to instill confidence.
The opposition will be cautious to avoid provoking a government crackdown. Policies will be kept consistent to prove Jordan is continuing on course, preserving the old king’s legacy.
The new king, Abdullah II, will reassure allies and friends that he will keep all of Jordan’s commitments, while letting enemies know that he is not weak. Each step he takes will be carefully designed to prove his readiness and competence.
Naturally, Jordanians are extremely nervous about the future.
Hussein’s death is an inconceivable event for them. They don’t want the roller-coaster existence that is the fate of many in neighboring countries. They worry that changes in government policies, domestic or foreign, may hurt them.
Yet these fears and tears which will be so visible in the coming days do not mean such expectations will be realized.
Abdullah is better prepared than was Hussein when he became king so long ago. Moreover, external and internal threats facing Jordan are far less than those of the past.
The first foretaste of Abdullah’s era will be his appointments for high office. Which of the old king’s men will remain? What faces will emerge from the younger generation? How much will Abdullah depend on army buddies?
Next will come signals to Jordan’s enemies, neutrals and friends. In the first category, the king will seek to avoid confrontation. Abdullah has nothing to lose by letting Syria and Iraq believe they can do business with him.
While Jordan’s rulers fear Iraq, they want sanctions lifted for their own economy’s sake. Perhaps there will be a conciliation signal toward Saddam Hussein. But Jordan’s policy will remain basically opposed to the radical regimes.
Abdullah’s best opportunity is with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
He is not responsible, after all, for his father’s pro-Saddam policy during the 1990-1991 crisis. Any concern about Jordan’s instability gives the Saudis and Kuwaitis an incentive to help the young king. Similarly, Egypt wants to persuade Abdullah to follow its leadership. With these countries, Abdullah is likely to enjoy a honeymoon.
Yet none of this implies any worsening of relations with the United States or Israel. These countries are Abdullah’s insurance policy. All the big steps have already been taken by his father, so the new king has little to lose by maintaining established policies. The half-British, British-educated monarch will be friendly toward the West, a stance reinforced by his career in Jordan’s army.
For Jordan, of course, the Palestinian issue is vital as both a foreign and domestic concern. The fact that Jordan will have a queen who shares their background will not be lost on the country’s Palestinians.
Already, insecurity about their future status has made Palestinians there cautious ever since the Israeli-Palestinian peace process began. Abdullah’s marriage could symbolize for them a future Jordanian-Palestinian synthesis, a vision of bridging current divisions and conflicting priorities.
At any rate, while outsiders often talk about the Palestinian potential to take over Jordan, Palestinians there worry far more about the East Bankers crushing them.Former Crown Prince Hassan was known as a relative hardliner toward the Palestinians. Thus, they are likely to welcome Abdullah.
Moreover, Hussein had already taken all the important steps in dealing with Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians across the river. Jordan abandoned its claim to the West Bank, accepted limited involvement in those issues (except for eastern Jerusalem holy sites), and was resigned to a Palestinian state.
Abdullah does not have to do too much regarding any of those questions. The biggest change will be that, unlike his father, he will not be able to play peacemaker. While Hussein’s help in getting the Hebron and Wye agreements was quite honorable, it was also more of a symbolic than substantive nature.
The real test will come in five years or so, if and when Abdullah has proven himself the rightful, capable monarch ready to move out from his father’s shadow. As for now, part of Hussein’s great legacy — despite his last-minute reshuffling of succession — was his ability to give Jordan a relatively serene transition.