I count myself in the “national camp” and instinctively shy away from words like withdrawal. No longer, though, in the case of Lebanon.
After long and hard deliberation, I have come to the conclusion that Israeli policy in south Lebanon has failed miserably. I decided this even before the tragic deaths of the past two weeks.
It should be our top national priority to cut our losses in Lebanon. We can achieve this only by initiating an organized and quick return to the international border.
The question of Lebanon has never polarized Israeli politics along the familiar ideological lines of left and right. In the early, euphoric days of the 1982 “Operation Peace for Galilee,” supporters came from both camps.
As the situation got out of hand, the erosion of support for the early goals of the Lebanese adventure engulfed both the right and left.
David Levy, for example, enhanced his political reputation when he joined Labor ministers in the national unity government in 1985 in voting for withdrawal to the current lines.
Today, the Israel Defense Force is preoccupied with self-defense, protecting its soldiers — and nothing else. We can and should be doing that from our sovereign territory, with overwhelming internal support and without international criticism.
There are three factors in Lebanon with which we have to deal: Hezbollah, Lebanon’s government and army, and Syria. All three know that the current situation is in their favor.
Hezbollah needs the war against Israel to continue justifying its revolutionary ideology. While Lebanon as a whole rejects that ideology, Hezbollah is represented, among other political parties, in the new Lebanese parliament.
Without its holy war in the south, Hezbollah would be confronted with the boring reality of competing with other political parties for the hearts and souls of Lebanon’s poor, mainly the Shi’ites.
The removal of Rafik Hariri and election of the Syrian-dominated Salim Hoss as the newest prime minister is another example of why Israel’s presence aids its enemies.
Hariri was business-oriented and pro-American. He understood that the volatile situation in the south posed a threat to Lebanon’s stability and undermined its rating in the international finance community.
He was more inclined than other Lebanese politicians to consider the possibility of a negotiated Israeli withdrawal, but he was forced out and his successor is in Syria’s pocket.
This pocket, it seems, is deep enough to digest not only Lebanon’s politics, but also Israel’s presence in south Lebanon. This presence, following years of stagnation and routine, poses no danger to Syria’s interest.
Lebanon is more stable than ever, and Syria’s grip on its internal and external politics is unshakable. Israel is in a no-win situation. Why on earth should the Syrian leader Hafez Assad even care to reconsider his policy in south Lebanon?
His strategic aims in Lebanon are stabilizing the once-uncontrollable country. He has achieved that. He still wants to put pressure on Israel in the south, in order to instigate another round of talks over the Golan Heights.
Assad wants any Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon through an agreement with the puppet government in Beirut to include the re-opening of the Golan file. To Assad, that means a complete Israeli surrender of the Golan Heights.
Continuing the futile and costly Israeli presence in south Lebanon plays into Assad’s hands. Leaving south Lebanon and creating a new balance of deterrence between Israel and Syria in Lebanon is contrary to Assad’s aims and desires.
True, if Assad wants to pressure Israel he can still order the Hezbollah to harass us, even after a redeployment of the IDF along the international border.
However, experience shows that he will not. Assad is extremely careful not to provoke trouble in the Golan itself and he will be just as careful after a withdrawal from south Lebanon.
With all this in mind, does Israel’s government have the stamina and determination to pursue such a policy?
For our security’s sake, let’s hope and pray that it does.