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Twenty-seven years after the joint surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on Yom Kippur, Oct. 6, 1973, Israel is again caught by surprise in three unforeseen developments: the eruption of hostilities by the Palestinians, clashes by Israeli Arabs and renewed hostilities by Hezbollah.

Although they are three separate developments, with different reasoning behind each of them, they have two things in common: They are the result of the weakness projected by Ehud Barak's government, and they are an outcome of a badly managed leadership and policymaking process.

Take, for example, the evacuation of our soldiers from Joseph's Tomb in Nablus. It was long overdue. Almost no tomb is worth risking life and bloodshed, especially when it is quite evident that Joseph, the son of Jacob, is not buried there. Barak should have ordered the evacuation a long time ago, but he did not listen to other voices and advice, especially from the military and security forces. The same happened with our retreat from south Lebanon: It was done in haste and projected an image of a weakened state.

That is the one character flaw that makes Yasser Arafat and Barak almost identical twins: Both the Palestinian and Israeli leaders are holding one-man shows, making the most vital decisions without any democratic process. No one understands Arafat's mind and no one knows in advance what Barak's next move will be.

The current terrible and dangerous crisis, which threatens to bring us all back to the darkest days of the intifada, is a direct result of the modus operandi of both leaders. They misread each others' intentions: Arafat believes that under pressure Barak will be forced to a deeper compromise, while Barak mistakenly figured that his far-reaching concessions would bring about a final and comprehensive peace agreement.

Both leaders were ill prepared for the latest rounds of negotiations.

Arafat does not understand that his stubbornness will only bring about a hard-line Israeli government. Barak failed to check whether his wide-scope yielding would be reciprocated in kind. Barak also did not fulfill all his previous agreements and promises to Arafat. The combined result is a bloody confrontation that not only threatens to nullify all that was achieved since Oslo, but also causes a dangerous deterioration in our internal relations with Israel's Arab citizens.

For too many years we have taken their loyalty for granted, while treating them as second-class citizens. Very few governments, both right and left, tried sincerely to change the course and grant Israeli Arabs equal treatment, rights and opportunities. The last government that tried to do something positive in this direction was that of Yitzhak Rabin. Barak promised to follow Rabin's way and implement his plans but failed to do so, until the latest developments forced him to start doing something.

Israel is now facing one of its most crucial and historical decisions on three fronts: how to prevent war with the Palestinians, how to repair the relations with our Arab citizens and how to prevent the resumption of a war of attrition along our border with Lebanon. All this while trying to continue the quest for peace — not at any price, but with readiness for far-reaching compromises that must bring peace and security to all parties concerned.

That is the ultimate test of leadership for Barak. The next few days will prove whether he can make wise decisions while under enormous pressure. He can win an immediate but short-lived popularity by resorting to the quick use of force, declaring the Oslo accords dead and forming a coalition of national unity. That is the easy way, but it is not the wisest. This is the time for strong and determined leadership that does not necessarily choose to appease the extremists in Israel.

This is not the time to form a government of hardliners like Ariel Sharon, who created the mess of unnecessary settlements in places not vital for our security and who continue to press for the annulment of the peace process.

This is the time for a government that includes only the forces that really want to advance the goal of peace, against all aspects of extremism. It is time for a government that presents a strong stand in matters of security.

At the same time, the Israeli government cannot forget that at the end of the military activity, it will have to come back to the negotiating table and continue the peace process from the point it was stalled, on the basis of past accords, achievements and compromises made or promised.