Traveling south along Jerusalem’s Hebron Road toward Gilo, looking eastward; or traveling north toward the settlements of Ofer and Adam, the construction is hard to miss. Heavy caterpillars and D-9s are feverishly moving huge masses of earth and stone, scarring roads across hilltops and open spaces.
These roadworks are constructing the Jerusalem Security Envelope, which is part of the larger national project known as the “Seam Project” (Proyect Hatefer), meant to prevent Palestinian terrorists from penetrating into Israel. The Jerusalem envelope is intended to surround Jerusalem with a fence that will keep terrorists out and provide weary Jerusalemites with a safe respite.
The thought of an enveloping, insulating fence may be comforting, but a closer look reveals that the envelope isn’t closed very tightly. At the moment, only 12.4 miles at two unconnected spots in the north and the east are being constructed. Jerusalem’s eastern side remains vulnerable and exposed, since the government hasn’t decided on the eastern route and the points at which the northern and southern components will be joined.
On April 4, a governmental ministerial committee approved Decision 64B, which called for the establishment of a “fence” between Israel and the Palestinians in three main areas — Umm el-Fahm, Kalkilya-Tulkarm and the area surrounding Jerusalem. Responsibility for the route of the fence lies with the prime minister and the minister of defense, who consult with the Ministry of Internal Security, the Israel Defense Forces, and the Police Force. The Seam Project, headed by project manager Col. (Res.) Netzah Mashiah, was established within the Ministry of Defense in order to implement the decision.
A spokesman for Minister Eli Suissa confirmed that Suissa, who is the minister responsible for Jerusalem, was not involved “in any way” in the Jerusalem Security Envelope planning. Although the spokesman for the Municipality of Jerusalem refused to respond to this report, sources within the municipality confirmed that the municipality “is only involved as a consultant.”
Once operational, the fence will be operated by the Israel Defense Forces in coordination with the Border and regular police.
Government communiques and media discussions refer to the “fence.”
According to Mashiah, the “fence” will be between 165 and 231 feet wide and will include moats studded with metal obstacles to obstruct motor vehicles; patrol roads; and dirt roads that will be dusted for footprints in order to track possible infiltrators. A “smart fence,” with electronic indicators, thermal observation posts and video cameras, will be in the middle. On the outer edges of the barrier, barbed wire will hinder potential infiltrators and, more importantly, prevent innocent people from “wandering in” to the fence area. The entire fence area will be considered a closed military zone with “open fire” orders to be determined by the commanders in the field.
The 65 feet currently under construction will cost, according to Mashiah, about $4.6 million, or about 71,000 for each foot. Mashiah states that the budget is adequate for the construction of the fence itself, and five infrastructure contractors and one electronic contractor are already at work. He believes that these northern and southern components will be completed by April 2003.
However, not only is the route in the east still undetermined, experts expect that whatever the route, it will cost at least $920 million, but these sums were not included in the budget proposal that passed its first reading in the Knesset this summer.
The government decision of June 23, states categorically that “the fence, like other obstacles, is a security measure and its construction is not an expression of a political or any other kind of border.”
However, it is clear that security is not — and maybe in Jerusalem it cannot be — the only consideration that is determining the route of the fence.
Security fences, says a source close to the Seam Project, means “that ‘they’ are over there, and ‘we’ are over here. In Jerusalem, it means that we control the flow of individuals into Jerusalem and between Jerusalem neighborhoods. But in some areas, like in the east around Abu-Dis and Ras-el-Amoud, we simply can’t seal off the city, because the areas are heavily populated and because Jews have moved into Arab neighborhoods. And in other areas, where we might be able to separate between us and them, the politicians won’t let us.”
One of the initial proposals for the route of the Jerusalem envelope, based almost solely on security considerations, suggested constructing fences and obstacles within Jerusalem proper, dividing between east and west sides of town. But the Security Cabinet rejected the proposals, contending that “Jerusalem must remain undivided and united.”
In Jerusalem, municipal boundaries often also include sacred and religious boundaries. The Israel Defense Force originally proposed that the envelope would run north of Rachel’s Tomb on Jerusalem’s southern boundary, and that worshipers would continue to reach the Tomb in armored buses. But Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert demanded that the fence be moved about 660 feet to the south in order to encompass Rachel’s Tomb. The army resisted, contending that in order to do so, several dozen Palestinian buildings, some with historical and religious significance, would have to be demolished and several hundred Palestinians, none of whom are residents of Jerusalem, would wind up residing within the envelope. But politics and religion trumped security.
It is in the east that the contradictions between security, municipal, political, and human and social boundaries stump almost every decision.
The insulating envelope around Jerusalem would thus include close to 300,000 Palestinians in the protected area who can’t be “separated” without undermining the principle of the “unity of Jerusalem.” The issue is further complicated by the need to bring places like Ma’aleh Adumim and Givat Ze’ev inside the security envelope.
But in that case, what’s the purpose of establishing a security strip when so many potentially hostile elements live within the area?
Says the source close to the project, “The more Palestinians who are not residents of Jerusalem are included inside the envelope, the more we will have to build concentric series of fences and checkpoints within Jerusalem proper.”
The result, predicts attorney Daniel Seidemann, an expert on Jerusalem affairs, will be the need for checkpoints within Jerusalem — along Rehov Hanevi’im near the former no-man’s land, in Abu Tor near the former border and the fences in East Talpiot, and near the Arab village of Jabel Mukaber. These would provide additional buffers within the ostensibly-buffered zone.
Even if the envelope doesn’t extend as far east as Ma’aleh Adumim, the areas closer to Jerusalem, such as Abu-Dis, pose a formidable problem.
“The area of Abu-Dis is densely populated,” says Seidemann. “The army has already put up concrete slabs in the middle of urban residential and business areas. There are children in Abu-Dis who live close to their their school, but because they have to go around the blockades, they have to travel 11 miles to get to them.”
But there is no reason, Mashiah says, that checkpoints can’t offer easy access to town.
“Electronic passages, with smart cards and other sophisticated means of identification, could provide for the dignified, speedy, efficient passage of people and services, Jewish or Arab.” For now, though, there is no budget available for construction of these passages.