But this yardstick overlooks one crucial fact: Soldiers, and civilians, are now dying closer to home instead. And unfortunately, this is far from coincidental. The current Palestinian uprising is directly connected to the Lebanon pullout.
Stripped of its public relations trappings, the essence of the pullout was as follows: A guerrilla organization, badly outnumbered and even more badly outgunned by the Israeli Defense Force, managed to inflict a fairly small number of casualties on Israel over a period of years. These so traumatized segments of the Israeli public that they began demanding withdrawal at any price, overturning the previous consensus that Israel should leave only in the context of agreements that would guarantee the safety of its northern border.
As a result, Barak campaigned and won on a pledge of unilateral withdrawal with nothing demanded of either Lebanon or Syria in exchange. And then, to add icing to Hezbollah’s cake, the IDF was forced to execute a hasty overnight flight several weeks before the official pullout date.
Thus the message of Lebanon was that violence pays handsomely. All you have to do is inflict a small but steady flow of casualties on Israel, and pressure from its own voters eventually will force the government to accede to your demands.
Not being stupid, the Palestinians quickly grasped this lesson. Hezbollah’s success in getting Israel out of Lebanon is frequently cited by Palestinian men-on-the street (as opposed to the leadership) as an inspiration for the current violence. The Palestinian youths that make up the core of the rioters can be heard chanting “learn from Hezbollah” as they march through the West Bank and Gaza. And the result is a new intifada.
Moreover, the damage caused by the Lebanon precedent may not end with the Palestinians. One of the most frightening developments in the current conflict was an army intelligence briefing to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee last week. It stated that, for the first time in years, Syria would be willing to go to war with Israel should it feel that its interests in Lebanon are threatened. This is largely because Syria now believes it could win such a war.
And according to both Israeli and American intelligence experts, one of the main reasons for this change of heart is that Syria’s new president, Bashar Assad, was very impressed by Hezbollah’s success in forcing Israel out of Lebanon.
It is, obviously, too late for Barak to reverse the costly mistake he made in Lebanon. But it is deeply worrying that he appears to have learned nothing from it. On the contrary, he is now creating an identical situation in the territories.
With the single exception of ordering the killing of a Palestinian militia leader last Thursday, Barak has forbidden the IDF to do anything unless it is attacked first. This is because, as he has declared at every opportunity, his goal is not to win the war but to return to the negotiating table and continue the land transfers that the violence so rudely interrupted. But always letting your enemy fire first reduces the number of military (as opposed to civilian) casualties you can inflict, while increasing your own casualty rate — even when you have an immense advantage in technology and equipment.
Thus, as in Lebanon, a war of attrition has been created, with a slow but steady trickle of Israeli deaths. And needless to say, it is eliciting the same public reaction: Columnists, politicians and public figures are again insisting that “there is no military solution” to this conflict, and that therefore the only choice is to give the Palestinians whatever they want.
But as long as Israel appears to be following the Lebanon pattern, the Palestinians have absolutely no incentive to stop shooting. Under this model, they are better off continuing the fighting for a few more months or years. The more Israeli casualties there are, the greater the public pressure will be for full compliance with their demands.
With the flight from Lebanon already a fait accompli, changing this model will not be easy. But if it can be done at all, it certainly cannot be done through empty declarations that “violence doesn’t pay” — declarations that not only are backed by neither military action nor other sanctions, but also are belied by the government’s stated willingness to use Israel’s previous offers as a starting point in renewed negotiations.
But unfortunately, such empty declarations are the only “solution” Barak has so far offered.