When the last Israeli settler leaves Gaza — voluntarily or otherwise — the Bush administration will face a surge of international pressure to resume efforts on behalf of its stalled road map for Palestinian statehood.
That could produce new friction between Jerusalem and Washington, but few observers expect a diplomatic crisis. The U.S.-Israel relationship remains fundamentally strong, despite outstanding issues between the two allies. And growing skepticism over whether the Palestinian Authority is up to the job of governing provides an extra measure of insulation.
Here’s a quick survey of the strengths and weakness of the U.S.-Israel alliance as it moves into the uncharted territory of the post-Gaza era.
Bush and Sharon
A primary strength is President George Bush’s unchanging view of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as an ally in the war on terrorism — a perception that has only strengthened because of the failure of Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas to rein in and disarm terror groups. And the two leaders have found ways to disagree without taking their disputes public, which has protected U.S.-Israel relations from some of the usual ups and downs.
But there is also widespread skepticism in the administration about Sharon’s intentions after the pullout and unhappiness over his reluctance to curb West Bank settlement construction, something seen as complicating U.S. policy in the region.
Sharon and Bush have a positive relationship based on a shared view of terrorism, but they are not close; they do not confide their plans in each other. And that represents a potential weakness in the uncertain days ahead.
Congress
It’s become part of Washington lore that support for Israel is now virtually wall to wall on Capitol Hill. That support provides a degree of insulation from any administration that decides it’s in the national interest to squeeze Israel.
But there are some shadows looming over that bright landscape.
While conservative Republicans have become Israel’s most hawkish supporters, they have never been put to the test. That test will come when they are forced to choose sides in a squabble between an American president and an Israeli prime minister.
On the other side, Democrats remain strongly pro-Israel, despite partisan-tinged charges by the GOP, but there are troubling signs, including the continuing coolness of some in the Congressional Black Caucus, the rage of some liberal Democrats over Bush’s overall approach to foreign policy and the perception by some Democrats that the pro-Israel leadership has become an extension of the Republican Party.
All of that suggests the risk that support for Israel could get entangled in the bitter, take-no-prisoners partisan conflict that defines American politics in this new century.
The Strategic Relationship
Again, a mixed bag, with a lot of strengths and some glaring weaknesses.
As American troops continue battling insurgents in Iraq, they are receiving significant technical help from Israeli forces that have learned to deal with things like improvised explosives and attackers who hide in mosques.
For years, pro-Israel lobbyists touted the “strategic relationship” between the two allies, and it’s a no-brainer that relationship took on new meaning when the United States went to war with some of the same forces that have long targeted the Jewish state.
But there is also a deep vein of mistrust within the U.S. defense establishment, made deeper by Israel’s arrogant response to U.S. concerns about its arms deals with China. Israeli officials were blind to shifting U.S. attitudes on China; even when warned by friends here, they concluded deals that were bound to set off alarm bells at the Pentagon.
So far, concern about the arms deals has not spread far beyond the Pentagon; it is important for Israel to act quickly to conclude a memorandum of understanding that could prevent the military dispute from tainting the political relationship. n